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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Education is a cornerstone of the American political landscape 
and a foundation of the “American dream.”  It prepares children for 
their future, it sustains a successful democracy as it continues to 
develop, and it propels us into our future as a nation.  It is a unique 
issue in that support and strategy in education is far more bipartisan 
than in many other political issues.1  There has been much discussion 
over the past several years about reforming a broken education 
system.2  President Barack Obama has spoken extensively on 
education issues in the United States throughout his presidency,3 with 
particular focus on early learning, postsecondary education, and 
                                                            
* Angela Estrella-Lemus is a third year student at Pepperdine University 
School of Law.  I would like to thank Emily Casey, for all of her help and guidance 
in the early stages of writing this article.  Thank you to Sam, for always having 
seasonal candy in the office, for reading this article (and every article in this issue) 
over and over again, and for being such an impressive journal partner this year (If 
you are reading this in a book right now, we did it!).  Finally, and most 
importantly, thank you to my mom, my dad, and my sister, Christina, for being my 
three favorite people. 
 
1 Alex Altman, Education Reform: Obama’s Bipartisan Issue?, TIME (Mar. 17, 
2010), http://content.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1972820,00.html. 
2 John Converse Townsend, How Should We Rebuild the U.S. Education 
System?, FORBES (Feb. 15, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashoka/2013/02/15/how-should-we-rebuild-the-u-s-
education-system/. 
3 See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on a World-Class 
Education at McGavock High School (Jan. 30, 2014), transcript available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/30/remarks-president-world-
class-education (discussing the importance of education, rewarding the best 
teachers, and high-quality early education); see also Sam Dillon, Obama Calls for 
Major Change in Education Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/14/education/14child.html?pagewanted=all 
(describing President Obama’s call for an overhaul of No Child Left Behind); Jason 
Koebler, Obama Pushes STEM in State of the Union, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT (Jan. 25, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/stem-
education/2012/01/25/obama-pushes-stem-in-state-of-the-union (identifying 
President Obama’s focus on STEM in the State of the Union); President Barack 
Obama, Prepared Remarks of President Barack Obama: Back to School Event 
(Sept. 8, 2009), transcript available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/MediaResources/PreparedSchoolRemarks (discussing 
personal responsibility for education). 
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teacher education.4  Regardless of the issue, education is always at 
least part of the answer.  President Obama says, “If we want America 
to lead in the 21st century, nothing is more important than giving 
everyone the best education possible—from the day they start 
preschool to the day they start their career.”5  The country needs 
quality teachers, smaller classrooms, and a focus on science, 
technology, engineering, and mathematics education.  All of these 
things are important, but the education agenda caters to the majority 
(as is necessary for a national agenda of any kind), which inevitably 
leaves certain subgroups out of the big picture of education. 
Special education, a term that refers to the education of students 
with disabilities, is a subset of the education system with specific 
requirements and strategies, as such students have specific needs.6  
By its nature, special education is different from general education 
because it must be different.  Students with disabilities often have to 
overcome hardships due to their disabilities, which make it more 
challenging for them to learn and receive a valuable education.   
They have to exist in an education system that, on a large scale, was 
not built for them. 
                                                            
4 See Alyson Klein, Obama Sells Race to the Top Early-Childhood Education 
in State of the Union, EDUCATION WEEK BLOGS (Jan. 28, 2014, 9:44 PM), 
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-
12/2014/01/president_obama_renews_call_fo.html (discussing President Obama’s 
focus on early-childhood education in the State of the Union); see also Elizabeth 
Green, Building A Better Teacher, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 2, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/07/magazine/07Teachers-t.html?pagewanted=all 
(discussing the issues with improving teacher quality); Tamar Lewin, Obama’s 
Plan Aims to Lower Cost of College, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/22/education/obamas-plan-aims-to-lower-cost-
of-college.html (discussing President Obama’s proposals to make college more 
affordable). 
5 Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, New Report 
Highlights Impacts of Teacher Layoffs, Need to Invest in Education (Aug. 18, 
2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/18/new-
report-highlights-impacts-teacher-layoffs-need-invest-education; see also 
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Investing in Our Future: Returning 
Teachers to the Classroom (Aug. 2012), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/Investing_in_Our_Future_Report 
.pdf. 
6 20 U.S.C. § 1401(29) (2012). 
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This comment analyzes the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (IDEA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA), and the protections they afford to students with disabilities.  
In theory, these two acts, which both provide for individuals with 
disabilities, should be able to coexist, but in practice, there is conflict 
between the ADA and the IDEA with respect to how to provide for 
students with disabilities.7  The ADA and the IDEA have two 
significant differences.8  First, the two acts have different purposes.9  
The ADA has noneducational objectives—providing individuals with 
disabilities the same opportunities as those without disabilities.10  In 
comparison, the IDEA has specifically educational objectives—
providing individuals with disabilities the same educational 
opportunities as those without disabilities.11  Second, Congress 
intended the IDEA to govern issues of education, as seen through the 
most recent amendments to the ADA and the IDEA, respectively.12  
Given these differences, courts have difficulty developing a unified 
theory for addressing claims that are brought under both the ADA 
and the IDEA.13 
Part II discusses the relevant federal statutes relating to the issue 
of educating students with disabilities.14  Part III discusses the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals case, K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified 
School District,15 presenting the issue regarding the interrelationship 
of the IDEA and the ADA.16  In this case, the court of appeals ruled 
that failure of an IDEA claim does not preclude an ADA claim on the 
same issue.17  This case, deciding an issue of first impression for the 
Ninth Circuit, sets precedent for an inefficient and costly way of 
                                                            
7 See infra Part V. 
8 See infra Part V.A. 
9 See infra Part V.A. 
10 See infra Part V.A. 
11 See infra Part V.A. 
12 See infra Part V.B. 
13 See infra Part III.B. 
14 See infra Part II. 
15 725 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied 134 S.Ct. 1493 (2014), cert. 
denied 134 S.Ct. 1494 (2014). 
16 See infra Part III. 
17 See infra Part III. 
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providing remedies for issues of special education in California.18  
Part IV discusses general education, special education, and funding 
education in California.19  Part V compares the IDEA and the ADA 
and suggests that California courts should treat the IDEA as having 
primacy over the ADA in matters of special education.20  
 
II. HISTORY OF FEDERAL STATUTES ADDRESSING EDUCATION OF 
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES 
 
A. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 Section 504 
 
The first two major decisions to address individuals with 
disabilities and start the movement addressing special education were 
Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children (PARC) v. 
Pennsylvania,21 and Mills v. Board of Education.22  These cases 
“expand[ed] on the Brown decision . . . by establishing that denying 
education to children with disabilities or treating them differently 
within the educational system was a denial of equal protection and 
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.”23  
The Supreme Court held that a school district is obligated to provide 
school-age children a "free and suitable publicly-supported education 
regardless of the degree of the child's . . . disability or impairment."24  
Following these two cases was the 1973 Rehabilitation Act25—which 
                                                            
18 See infra Part III. 
19 See infra Part IV. 
20 See infra Part V. 
21 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971).  “Having undertaken to provide a free 
public education to all of its children, including its exceptional children, the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania may not deny any mentally retarded child access 
to a free public program of education and training.”  Id. at 1259. 
22 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).  “[T]he Board of Education has an 
obligation to provide whatever specialized instruction that will benefit the child.  
By failing to provide plaintiffs and their class the publicly supported specialized 
education to which they are entitled, the Board of Education violates the above 
statutes and its own regulations.”  Id. at 874. 
23 LAURA ROTHSTEIN & JULIA ROTHSTEIN, DISABILITIES AND THE LAW 5 
(Thomas Reuters, West 4th ed. 2009); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 
483 (1954).  
24 Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 878. 
25 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–796 (2012). 
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prohibits federal entities from discriminating against people with 
disabilities.26   
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section 504) was 
the first law to be enacted protecting persons with disabilities as it 
exists today.27  It paved the way for the ADA and the IDEA.28  
Section 504 applies to entities that receive federal funds; it prohibits 
discrimination against people based on disabilities, stating:  
 
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in 
the United States, as defined in section 705(20) of this 
title, shall, solely by reason of his or her disability, be 
excluded from the participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance . . . .29  
 
Additionally, Section 504 requires employers to reasonably 
accommodate employees with disabilities by making changes in 
                                                            
26 ROTHSTEIN & ROTHSTEIN, supra note 23, at 5.  The 1973 Rehabilitation Act 
consists of three major provisions: Section 501 mandates nondiscrimination and 
affirmative action by federal employers.  Id.  Section 503 imposes 
nondiscrimination and affirmative action in employment requirements for federal 
contractors.  Id.  The most far-reaching and significant section is section 504.  Id.  
Section 504 applies to recipients of federal financial assistance, including education 
programs, public facilities, transportation, and health and welfare services.  Id.  It 
mandates nondiscrimination and reasonable accommodation and, until 1990, was 
the most significant federal protection for individuals with disabilities.  Id. 
27 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012).  The statutory language 
in section 794 first appeared in section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and is 
therefore referred to throughout this article as “Section 504.”  Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, Pub. L. 93–112, 87 Stat. 355, available at 
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja
&uact=8&ved=0CCUQFjAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww2.ed.gov%2Fpolicy%2
Fspeced%2Fleg%2Frehabact.doc&ei=S3K5VNnRHcTioATUqILgAw&usg=AFQj
CNE_9FKCxGz4jspmciV7TIy0mSIZ3Q&sig2=UY0L7LOArRrZNoI6Ye6O8A. 
28 See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012).   
29 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012).  The term “individual with a disability” is 
defined as any individual who “(i) has a physical or mental impairment which for 
such individual constitutes or results in a substantial impediment to employment; 
and (ii) can benefit in terms of an employment outcome from vocational 
rehabilitation services provided pursuant to subchapter I, III, or VI of this chapter.”  
29 U.S.C. § 705 (20)(A) (2012). 
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working conditions.30  In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,31 
“the United States Supreme Court noted that the purpose of the 
Rehabilitation Act was to provide handicapped Americans with 
opportunities for an education, transportation, housing, health care, 
and jobs that other Americans take for granted.”32  After the 
Rehabilitation Act was passed, President Richard Nixon designated 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare as the agency to 
coordinate the enforcement of the Act.33  When the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare split into the Department of Health 
and Human Services and the Department of Education in 1979, the 
Department of Education took over the responsibility of enforcing 
the provisions and preventing discrimination against people with 
disabilities.34 
 The first major case to interpret Section 504 was Southeastern 
Community College v. Davis.35  The Court determined that an 
                                                            
30 Ronald D. Wenkart, The Reasonable Accommodation Requirements of 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 62 ED. LAW REP. 11, 13 (1990). 
31 480 U.S. 273, 275 (1987). 
32  Wenkart, supra note 30, at 12. 
33 Id. at 13.  
34 Id.  
35 Id. at 14; see also Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 400 (1979).  The 
respondent in this case suffered from a serious hearing disability and was denied 
admission to Southeastern Community College’s Associate Degree Nursing 
program (an institution that receives federal funds).  Id.  The Executive Director of 
the North Carolina Board of Nursing recommended that the respondent not be 
admitted because her hearing disability would make her unable to safely care for 
patients.  Id. at 401.  After this evaluation and recommendation, the nursing staff of 
Southeastern Community College voted to deny the respondent admission.  Id. at 
402.  Upon review of the respondent’s situation, the Court found that 
Southeastern’s denial of admission was not discrimination, explaining that the 
purpose of the program was to train persons to serve in the nursing profession in 
customary ways.  Id. at 403.  It was undisputed that the respondent could not 
qualify for this program unless the program’s standards were lowered, and 
Southeastern is not required to lower standards to accommodate a person with a 
disability.  Id. at 413.  An institution is not required to disregard disabilities or 
make substantial changes in order to allow that person to participate.  Id.  The fact 
that Southeastern was unwilling to make major adjustments to its program does not 
constitute discrimination in this situation because the respondent was not an 
otherwise qualified candidate—a person who is able to meet all of a program’s 
requirements despite a handicap or disability.  Id. at 406.  Hearing was essential to 
the nature of this program.  Id. at 400–12. 
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institution is not required to lower its standards or make substantial 
modifications in a program such that a person with a disability can 
participate.36  A government-funded institution, cannot, however, 
discriminate against an otherwise qualified person solely by reason of 
a disability.37  The cases that followed Southeastern38 established that 
the reasonable accommodation requirements of Section 504 apply to 
all special education students, as well as aids and equipment that may 
assist these students and their parents.39  The reasonable 
accommodation requirements do not require significant modification 
or fundamental alteration of the educational program, “but where 
accommodation is not financially or administratively burdensome, 
modification of nonessential requirements that prevent persons with 
disabilities from participating in the educational program must be 
made.”40  Section 504 is still in effect today.41 
 
B. Americans with Disabilities Act 
 
The ADA was signed into law by President George H. W. Bush 
on July 26, 1990.42  The primary difference between Title II of the 
ADA and Section 504 is that Section 504 only applies to entities that 
receive federal funds, whereas the ADA applies to all public 
institutions.  Modeled after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Section 
504, the ADA was created in order to prohibit discrimination on the 
                                                            
36 Wenkart, supra note 30, at 15.   
37 Id. at 14.   
38 Id. at 16; see also Brookhart v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 697 F.2d 179, 183 
(7th Cir. 1983); Colin K. v. Schmidt, 715 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1983). 
39 Wenkart, supra note 30, at 21.   
40 Id. 
41 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–796 (2012). 
42 INTRODUCTION TO THE ADA, http://www.ada.gov/ada_intro.htm (last visited 
Dec. 30, 2014).  At the time that the ADA was enacted, there were approximately 
forty-three million Americans with physical or mental disabilities.  ROTHSTEIN & 
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 23, at 2.  That number continues to increase as technology 
and medicine advances, saving the lives of children with severe physical and 
mental disabilities.  Neal Halfon et al., The Changing Landscape of Disability in 
Childhood, 22 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 1, 17 (2012), available at 
http://futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/publications/docs/22_01_FullJournal.p
df. 
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basis of disability,43 to ensure that Americans with disabilities would 
receive the same treatment as those without disabilities.44  The ADA 
uses the same eligibility criteria as Section 504 to determine who 
qualifies as disabled, and the ADA also affords the same protections 
against discrimination as Section 504.45  The legislative intent of the 
ADA was “to protect people, including children, with disabilities 
from being excluded based upon overprotective rules, policies, 
standards and criteria, and to provide these Americans with the 
ability to redress such discrimination in federal court.”46  In order to 
be protected under the ADA, one must have a disability as defined 
under the terms of the Act:47   
                                                            
43 Scott B. Mac Lagan, Right of Access: How One Disability Law Enabled 
Another, 26 TOURO L. REV. 735, 737 (2010); see also 42 U.S.C § 12101 (2012): 
1.  [T]o provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for 
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities; 
2. [T]o provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards 
addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities; 
3. [T]o ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in 
enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf 
of individuals with disabilities; and 
4. [T]o invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including 
the power to enforce the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment and to 
regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of 
discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.  
Id. 
44 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012). 
45 See Peter J. Maher, Caution on Exhaustion: The Courts’ Misinterpretation 
of the IDEA’s Exhaustion Requirement for Claims Brought by Students Covered by 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA but not by the IDEA, 44 CONN. 
L. REV. 259, 261 (2011). 
46 Mac Lagan, supra note 43, at 738. 
47 INTRODUCTION TO THE ADA, supra note 42; see also HOW TO COMPLY WITH 
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: A GUIDE FOR RESTAURANTS AND OTHER 
FOOD SERVICE EMPLOYERS, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/restaurant_guide_summary.html (last visited Dec. 30, 
2014): 
A person must have a serious, long-term medical condition or 
disorder that makes it very difficult for him or her to do basic 
activities.  The person also must be qualified to perform the job.  
This means that the person must have the education, experience 
or skills necessary to do the job AND must be able to perform the 
duties that are central to the job, with or without a reasonable 
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The term disability means, with respect to an 
individual:  
(A) A physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more major life activities of such 
individual;  
(B) a record of such an impairment; or  
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.48 
 
The ADA prohibits discrimination against people with 
disabilities, but does not guarantee the right to free appropriate public 
education (FAPE), which is one of the primary objectives of the 
IDEA. 
 
C. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
 
For decades, students with disabilities were largely ignored, until 
the enactment of the IDEA49—the first piece of legislation that 
specifically addressed educating Americans with disabilities.50  The 
                                                            
accommodation. 
Id. 
48 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012).  In general, “[‘]life activities’ include, but are 
not limited to[:] caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, 
eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, 
reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.”  42 U.S.C. 
§12102(2)(A) (2012).  Life activities also include “bodily functions,” including, 
“but not limited to[:] functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, 
digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, 
and reproductive functions.”  42 U.S.C. §12102(2)(B) (2012). 
49 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1475 (2012). 
50 Id.; see also Timothy E. Morse, Allan G. Osborne, Jr. & Charles J. Russo, 
Ten Commandments of Special Education, 237 ED. LAW REP. 571, 572 (2008).  
The Ten Commandments of Special Education are: 
1. Be diligent in finding and identifying children with 
disabilities 
2. Provide children and their parents with all of the due process 
that is due 
3. Thoroughly and timely evaluate all children with suspected 
disabilities 
4. Include parents as equal partners in the development of the 
IEP 
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first form of the IDEA was created in 1970 with the Education of the 
Handicapped Act, which was later reauthorized as the Education for 
All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA).51  Congress 
recognized that the educational needs of children with disabilities 
were not being met because: 
 
(1) the children did not receive appropriate 
educational services;  
(2) the children were excluded entirely from the public 
school system and from being educated with their 
peers; 
(3) undiagnosed disabilities prevented the children 
from having a successful educational experience; and  
(4) a lack of adequate resources within the public 
school system forced families to find services outside 
the public school system.52 
 
The EAHCA was reauthorized as the IDEA and was most 
recently reauthorized as the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Improvement Act of 2004 (IDEIA).53  Throughout the various forms 
of this Act, the purpose has remained to provide students with 
disabilities access to learning in schools.54  The IDEA definition of 
“disability,” as it exists today, is divided into two sections; the first 
                                                            
5. Make sure that the IEP is reasonably designed to provide 
educational benefit 
6. Include any necessary related services, assistive technology, 
and transition services 
7. Provide all programs and services in the least restrictive 
environment 
8. Review all IEPs at least annually and reevaluate children at 
least every three years 
9. Act promptly to resolve disputes 
10. Keep accurate records 
Id. at 571–78. 
51 Mac Lagan, supra note 43, at 740. 
52 Kathryn M. Smith & Richard Bales, Education for Americans with 
Disabilities: Reconciling IDEA with the 2008 ADA Amendments, 37 N. KY. L. REV. 
389, 391 (2010).  
53 Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, 20 U.S.C. 
§§ 1400–1475 (2012); see also Mac Lagan, supra note 43. 
54 Mac Lagan, supra note 43, at 740. 
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section defines “child with a disability” generally as a child: 
 
with intellectual disabilities, hearing impairments 
(including deafness), speech or language impairments, 
visual impairments (including blindness), serious 
emotional disturbance (referred to in this chapter as 
“emotional disturbance”), orthopedic impairments, 
autism, traumatic brain injury, other health 
impairments, or specific learning disabilities; and 
who, by reason thereof, needs special education and 
related services.55   
 
The second section explains that disability as it pertains to 
children ages three to nine could, at the discretion of the State and 
local education agency, include a child “experiencing developmental 
delays, as defined by the State and as measured by appropriate 
diagnostic instruments and procedures, in [one] or more of the 
following areas: physical development; cognitive development; 
communication development; social or emotional development; or 
adaptive development; and who, by reason thereof, needs special 
education and related services.”56  The IDEA provides federal 
funding from the Department of Education to provide for students 
with special education needs,57 but leaves the responsibility for 
developing and executing programs for children who qualify for 
assistance to the states.58  All public schools must comply with the 
IDEA.59  In addition to funding special education, the IDEA gives 
disabled students an “enforceable substantive right to public 
education.”60  But in order for a child to be protected under the 
                                                            
55 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (2012); see also William D. Goren, Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act: The Interrelationship to the ADA and Preventative 
Law, 71 FLA. B.J. 76, 79 (1997). 
56 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(B) (2012). 
57 ROTHSTEIN & ROTHSTEIN, supra note 23, at 70.  
58 78A CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM 262 (Joseph J. Bassano et al. eds., 2008). 
“Congress has enacted the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, which 
provides federal money to assist state and local agencies in educating disabled 
children.”  Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 263; see also Steven Marchese, Putting Square Pegs into Round 
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IDEA, the child must suffer an adverse effect on his or her academic 
achievement as a result of the defined disability.61 
The first Supreme Court case to discuss the concept of FAPE was 
Board of Education v. Rowley.62  Rowley addressed the issue of 
whether the IDEA required a school to provide a sign language 
interpreter to a deaf child.63  The Court ruled that if a state has 
complied with the procedural requirements of the IDEA and the 
individualized education program (IEP) developed through the Act’s 
procedures is “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive 
educational benefits,” then the state has complied with its obligations 
under the IDEA.64  The Court further held that “[t]he Act does not 
require a State to maximize the potential of each handicapped child 
commensurate with the opportunity provided nonhandicapped 
children,”65 but it does require the state to provide FAPE to qualified 
students with disabilities to tailor to their individual needs so that the 
students can advance from grade to grade.66  The Supreme Court 
                                                            
Holes: Mediation and the Rights of Children with Disabilities Under the IDEA, 53 
RUTGERS L. REV. 333, 335 (2001) (explaining that “the emphasis of the statute is 
on procedure—with detailed requirements to ensure parental participation in the 
initial evaluation and development of a child's educational plan, as well as a 
complex due process system to resolve disputes between parents, guardians, and 
the school district if an initial agreement is not possible.”). 
61 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM, supra note 58, at 263. 
62 458 U.S. 176, 179 (1982).  Justice Rehnquist held that (1) FAPE is satisfied 
when the state provides personalized instruction that permits the child with a 
disability to benefit from that personalized instruction, (2) FAPE does not require a 
state to maximize the potential of each child with a disability, and (3) in light of 
finding that a deaf child was advancing easily from grade to grade, the EAHCA did 
not require that the school provide the child with a sign-language interpreter.  Id. at 
209–10. 
63 Id. at 184–85. 
64 Id. at 206–07. 
65 Id. at 177. 
66 Id.  This decision can be read in different ways.  A narrow understanding of 
the Rowley decision can be read to say that the IDEA requires that public entities 
provide an equal opportunity to benefit from a public education, not make any 
guarantees on their success once provided these opportunities.  A more expansive 
view of the Rowley decision would show that the Court specifically refrained from 
establishing a test and instead conducted a case-specific analysis to determine if the 
educational benefits were adequate.  This remains a controversial ruling:  
In addition to its contentious minimal educational standard, there 
is confusion among the circuits and commentators as to Rowley's 
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stated that under IDEA, a “free appropriate public education” means 
special education and related services that:  “(A) have been provided 
at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and 
without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational 
agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or 
secondary school education in the State involved, and (D) are 
provided in conformity [with the IEP].”67 
The Act requires “specially defined instruction, and related 
services, at no cost to parents, to meet the unique needs of a child 
with a disability.”68  The IDEA requires that the state provide these 
services to students with disabilities from the ages of three to twenty-
two, or until the student graduates high school—whichever happens 
first.69  The IDEA also specifies certain factors that must be 
considered for students that have particular disabilities.70  After it is 
determined that a student has a disability and that the disability 
interferes with the student’s education, an IEP is prepared, which is 
an individualized written statement that defines the services that will 
be provided to the student.71  The required components of the IEP 
                                                            
application. For example, there is a circuit split regarding what 
constitutes the “educational benefit” portion of Rowley's FAPE 
definition.  Six circuits require the benefit to be meaningful, five 
require the benefit to merely be adequate or provide some 
benefit, and one uses a combination of both. 
David G. King, Van Duyn v. Baker School District: A “Material” Improvement in 
Evaluating a School District’s Failure to Implement Individualized Education 
Programs, 4 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 457, 461–62 (2009). 
67  Goren, supra note 55, at 79.  In Rowley, Justice Rehnquist further stated, 
“[I]f personalized instruction is being provided with sufficient supportive services 
to permit the child to benefit from the instruction, and the other items on the 
definitional checklist are satisfied, the child is receiving a ‘free appropriate public 
education’ as defined by the Act.”  458 U.S. at 189. 
68  Mac Taylor, Overview of Special Education in California (Jan. 3, 2013), 
available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2013/edu/special-ed-primer/special-ed-
primer-010313.pdf. 
69 Id. at 5. 
70 K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th 
Cir. 2013), cert. denied 134 S.Ct. 1493 (2014), cert. denied 134 S.Ct. 1494 (2014).  
In this case, which will be discussed in detail in Part III of this comment, the court 
discussed certain factors that must be considered for deaf or hard-of-hearing 
(DHH) students.  Id. 
71 Taylor, supra note 68, at 8. 
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include current status, goals, progress measures, services to be 
provided, inclusion in mainstream setting, an assessment plan, and 
any additional considerations.72  The purpose of an IEP is to have an 
education program that addresses each child’s specific needs so that 
the child can receive an appropriate education.73  The goal of an IEP 
is a cooperative process between the district and the parents of the 
child with special education needs.74 
The Supreme Court in Rowley next addressed whether Congress 
intended education of students with disabilities to meet a substantive 
standard, and looked to legislative history to answer this question.75  
Support for the education of students with disabilities was relatively 
recent; therefore, the goals of recent legislation at that time had not 
been overly ambitious, with the primary intent of making education 
available to students with disabilities, and without the expectation of 
any particular outcome.76  The Court took note of the fact that the 
courts in PARC and Mills discussed the legislative reports at length in 
their respective decisions.77  This suggested that the principles 
                                                            
72 Id. at 9.  An IEP “team” is also required.  Wilkins v. District of Columbia, 
571 F. Supp. 2d 163, 167 (D.D.C. 2008).  The team is composed of the parents of 
the child with a disability, a regular education teacher, a special education teacher, 
a school district representative, an individual who can interpret the student’s 
evaluation results, sometimes a person with particular knowledge of the student, 
and sometimes, the student herself.  Id.; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B) (2012). 
73 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM, supra note 58, at 266–67.  More specifically, in 
Rowley, the Court said that an IEP must contain: 
(A) a statement of the present levels of educational performance 
of such child, (B) a statement of annual goals, including short-
term instructional objectives, (C) a statement of the specific 
educational services to be provided to such child, and the extent 
to which such child will be able to participate in regular 
educational programs, (D) the projected date for initiation and 
anticipated duration of such services, and (E) appropriate 
objective criteria and evaluation procedures and schedules for 
determining, on at least an annual basis, whether instructional 
objectives are being achieved.   
458 U.S. 176, 182 (1982). 
74 Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005). 
75 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 190. 
76 Id. at 191–92.  “Thus, the intent of the Act was more to open the door of 
public education to handicapped children on appropriate terms than to guarantee 
any particular level of education once inside.”  Id. at 192.  
77 Id. at 193. 
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established in those two cases were principles that guided the drafters 
of the Act.78  The Court explained that, considering the Act together 
with the legislative history, congressional intent was to provide 
access to education for students with disabilities so that they may 
advance from grade to grade,79 but did not require any substantive 
level of education.80 
 
III. K.M. EX REL. BRIGHT 
 
A. Facts of the Case 
 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case, K.M. ex rel. Bright, 
addressed the issue regarding the interrelationship between the IDEA 
and the ADA.81  This case, decided in August 2013, consolidated two 
California cases, which both addressed public schools’ obligations to 
deaf or hard-of-hearing (DHH) students.82   
                                                            
78 Id. at 194.  The 1974 statute: 
“incorporated the major principles of the right to education 
cases,” by “add[ing] important new provisions to the Education of 
the Handicapped Act[,] which require the States to: establish a 
goal of providing full educational opportunities to all handicapped 
children; provide procedures for insuring that handicapped 
children and their parents or guardians are guaranteed procedural 
safeguards in decisions regarding identification, evaluation, and 
educational placement of handicapped children; establish 
procedures to insure that, to the maximum extent appropriate, 
handicapped children . . . are educated with children who are not 
handicapped; . . . and, establish procedures to insure that testing 
and evaluation materials and procedures utilized for the purposes 
of classification and placement of handicapped children will be 
selected and administered so as not to be racially or culturally 
discriminatory.” 
Id. at n.18.  This made it clear that the purpose of the Act was access, not 
substantive outcomes or achievement. 
79 Id. at 203–04.  
80 Id. 
81 K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th 
Cir. 2013), cert. denied 134 S.Ct. 1493 (2014), cert. denied 134 S.Ct. 1494 (2014). 
82 Id. 
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The first plaintiff, K.M., was a high school student in the Tustin 
Unified School District (Tustin) in Orange County, California.83  
K.M. had a hearing disability, causing her to have trouble hearing her 
classmates, as well as difficulty hearing videos that were shown in 
the classroom.84  Tustin had regular meetings to develop K.M.’s IEP, 
and at a June 2009 meeting of K.M.’s IEP team, K.M.’s mother 
requested that Tustin provide her with Communication Access 
Realtime Translation (CART) beginning on the first day of high 
school.85  After several meetings and trials of both CART and an 
alternative transcription technology called TypeWell, K.M.’s IEP 
team determined that K.M. did not need a transcription service in 
order to receive FAPE under the IDEA.86   
The second plaintiff, D.H., was a high school student in the 
Poway Unified School District (Poway) in San Diego County, 
California.87  Like K.M., D.H. also had a hearing disability and was 
eligible to receive special education services under the IDEA.88  
D.H.’s hearing disability caused her to have difficulty following class 
discussions and teacher instructions, a problem that continued after 
she started high school.89  Like in K.M.’s case, at an IEP meeting, 
D.H.’s parents requested that Poway provide her with CART, and the 
IEP team determined that CART was not necessary in order to 
provide D.H. with FAPE under the IDEA.90    
D.H. and K.M. both had hearings before a California 
administrative law judge (ALJ), who determined that their respective 
districts had fulfilled their obligations to D.H. and K.M. under the 
IDEA.91  D.H. and K.M. challenged their respective ALJ decisions in 
                                                            
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 1093. 
85 Id. at 1092.  “CART is a word-for-word transcription service, similar to 
court reporting, in which a trained stenographer provides real-time captioning that 
appears on a computer monitor.”  Id.  CART was a service that was recommended 
by K.M.’s auditory-visual therapist.  Id. at 1093. 
86 Id.  
87 Id. at 1092. 
88 Id. at 1094. 
89 Id. 
90 Id.   
91 Id. at 1092. 
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district court, alleging disability discrimination.92  The plaintiffs 
conceded that their respective districts and schools complied with the 
IDEA; they challenged only the validity of their ADA claims.93  
Thus, the specific issue addressed was “whether a school district’s 
compliance with its obligations to a [DHH] child under the IDEA 
also necessarily establishes compliance with its effective 
communication obligations to that child under Title II of the ADA.”94  
 
B. Ninth Circuit Holding 
 
The court held that “[t]he failure of an IDEA claim does not 
automatically foreclose a[n ADA] Title II claim grounded in the 
[ADA] Title II effective communications regulation,”95 determining 
that compliance with one act is not necessarily compliance with the 
other, and that one act does not have primacy over the other.96     
                                                            
92 Id.  K.M. challenged the ALJ decision under the IDEA, Section 504, the 
ADA, and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act.  Id. at 1093.  D.H. challenged the 
ALJ decision under Section 504, the ADA, and the IDEA.  Id. at 1094. 
93 Id. at 1092. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 1102.  The court of appeals decided not to review the record to 
determine whether there was an alternate ground on which to affirm summary 
judgment.  Id.  Because both districts on the original cases granted summary 
judgment on legal grounds, “neither district court considered whether there was a 
genuine issue of material fact as to the school districts’ compliance with [ADA] 
Title II.”  Id. at 1103.  Furthermore, the school districts litigated these cases as if 
the IDEA and ADA claims were equivalent.  Id.  As the court explains in footnote 
seven of this case, “Although [the school districts] made [ADA] Title II-specific 
arguments in the alternative, the IDEA claims were clearly the focus of their 
litigation efforts.”  Id. at n.7.  The court of appeals reversed the grants of summary 
judgment on the ADA claims in both cases and remanded to the district courts for 
further proceedings.  Id. at 1103.  The United States District, S.D. received D.H.’s 
case on remand, and the court ordered the Poway District to provide D.H. with 
CART during classes at school.  D.H. ex rel. Harrington v. Poway Unified Sch. 
Dist., No. 09–CV–2621–L, 2013 WL 6730163, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2013).  
Poway moved for reconsideration of the preliminary injunction granted by the S.D. 
court on remand; the court denied Poway’s motion for reconsideration.  D.H. ex 
rel. Harrington v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., No. 09–CV–2621–L, 2014 WL 
129070, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2014).  K.M.’s case has not yet been heard on 
remand. 
96 K.M. ex rel. Bright, 725 F.3d at 1102. 
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Addressing both K.M.’s and D.H.’s decisions together, the court 
of appeals acknowledged that, at least generally, schools are required 
to comply with both the ADA and the IDEA, but that they differ in 
their ends as well as their means:97 
 
Substantively, the IDEA sets only a floor of access to 
education for children with communications 
disabilities, but requires school districts to provide the 
individualized services necessary to get a child to that 
floor, regardless of the costs, administrative burdens, 
or program alterations required.  [ADA] Title II and 
its implementing regulations, taken together, require 
public entities to take steps towards making existing 
services not just accessible, but equally accessible to 
people with communication disabilities, but only 
insofar as doing so does not pose an undue burden or 
require a fundamental alteration of their programs.98 
 
 But the Ninth Circuit suggested that Congress intended for these 
two pieces of legislation to coexist.99  The court in K.M. ex rel. 
Bright specifically clarified that the IDEA does not foreclose any 
additional claims children with disabilities may have through other 
legislation, so long as they address their IDEA claims through the 
specified IDEA administrative procedure.100   
                                                            
97 Id. at 1097. 
98 Id.  
99 Id. 
100 Id.  The IDEA non-exclusivity provision reads: 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the 
rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, 
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 [42 U.S.C. § 12101 
et seq.], title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C. § 
791 et seq.], or other Federal laws protecting the rights of 
children with disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil 
action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under 
this subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f) and (g) shall 
be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the 
action been brought under this subchapter.   
Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2012)).   
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Specifically with respect to DHH children, the court looked at the 
language of the communication provisions contained in the ADA and 
the IDEA,101 which was an issue of first impression for the court.102  
In comparing the communication provisions in these two pieces of 
legislation, the court of appeals identified three significant 
differences.103  First, the factors that schools must consider when 
evaluating students with hearing problems under the IDEA and the 
ADA are different.104  When evaluating an IEP for IDEA purposes, 
the IEP team must focus on the child’s “needs” and “opportunities,” 
considering factors including “the child’s language and 
communication needs,” “opportunities for direct communications 
with peers and professional personnel in the child’s language and 
communication mode,” and “whether the child needs assistive 
technology devices and services.”105  However, under the ADA, the 
school, as a public entity, is required to “furnish appropriate auxiliary 
aids and services where necessary.”106  As the court of appeals 
explains, the ADA includes another requirement that the public entity 
“give primary consideration to the requests of the individual with 
disabilities.”107  This provision in the ADA, the court of appeals 
pointed out, has no IDEA counterpart.108   
Second, the ADA provides schools and districts with defenses 
that are not available under the IDEA.109  The ADA does not require 
public entities to make any changes that would fundamentally alter 
the nature of a service, program, or activity.110  It does not require a 
public entity to make changes that would pose an undue financial or 
administrative burden.111  The ADA also does not require a school to 
provide new programs or new curricula to accommodate a child with 
                                                            
101 Id. at 1100. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id.  
106 Id.  
107 Id. at 1100–01 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(2) (2014)). 
108 Id. at 1100. 
109 Id. at 1101. 
110 Id.  
111 Id. 
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a disability.112  These ADA defenses have no IDEA counterpart.113  
Under the IDEA, the school district must do whatever is necessary to 
ensure that a child with special needs advances from grade to 
grade.114   
Third, the ADA requires schools to provide equal education 
opportunities to all students, which is a requirement that is not 
relevant to IDEA claims.115  Given these differences, the court 
reasoned that it was not possible to determine a unified theory for the 
interaction between the ADA and the IDEA.116  Both cases were 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Ninth Circuit 
opinion.117  
By ruling that K.M. and D.H. could litigate their claims under the 
ADA after their IDEA claims failed, the court presented an important 
question about the relationship between the IDEA and the ADA, but 
was unable to provide comprehensive guidance regarding how other 
courts should handle claims brought under both acts.  The court 
acknowledged that it was speaking specifically about the issues 
facing DHH students and that the relationship between the IDEA and 
the ADA was a matter that had to be evaluated on a case-by-case 
basis.118  However, the general interaction of the IDEA and the ADA 
is a critical issue to resolve in order to ensure that the needs of 
students with disabilities in California are being properly evaluated 
and addressed.   
 
C. Analyzing the Ninth Circuit’s Holding 
 
In K.M. ex rel. Bright, K.M. and D.H. were both DHH 
students,119 and both students were arguing for CART under the 
ADA, not the IDEA, even though they requested CART for 
educational purposes.120  At first glance, the outright failure of their 
                                                            
112 Id. 
113 See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2012). 
114 Id. 
115 K.M. ex rel. Bright, 725 F.3d at 1101. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 1103. 
118 Id. at 1101. 
119 See supra Part III.A. 
120 See supra Part III.A. 
    
426 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 34-2 
IDEA claims is counterintuitive because these students did not 
receive the services that they believed would help them perform 
better in school.  Even though the IDEA claims were not successful 
for D.H. and K.M., the IDEA does more to protect their educational 
interests than the ADA, as the ADA does not speak specifically to 
education.  The existence of an IEP under the requirements of the 
IDEA ensures that students’ needs are being considered on an 
individual basis, whereas the ADA ensures only that individuals are 
not discriminated against for reason of disability.121  It is true that the 
definition of “disability” is broader under the ADA,122 so at face 
value, the ADA would appear more beneficial for special education 
students.  However, as previously mentioned, it is also true that the 
ADA does not require public entities to fundamentally alter an 
existing institution or system, or put themselves at financial risk in 
order to accommodate a student with a disability.123  The IDEA, on 
the other hand, must accommodate a student with a disability to a 
certain extent regardless of the cost to the school or to the district.124  
By this reasoning, the district courts in K.M.’s and D.H.’s respective 
cases were right to conclude that compliance with the IDEA results 
in compliance with the ADA. 
 
IV. EDUCATION IN CALIFORNIA 
 
A. General Education in California 
 
 I have chosen California to evaluate this issue of the 
interrelationship of the ADA and the IDEA because California is 
known for its frequent changes in education policy, and therefore has 
the potential to set an example for model legislation in other states.125   
                                                            
121 See supra Part II. 
122 See infra Part V. 
123 See supra Part II. 
124 See supra Part II. 
125 PACE, Californians and Public Education: Results from the Fourth 
PACE/USC Rossier Poll 1 (Nov. 2014), 
http://www.edpolicyinca.org/sites/default/files/PACE%20USC%20Poll%20Nov%
202014.pdf. 
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California is a state that is willing to adapt and grow as the education 
system continues to develop through laws and procedure.126 
 It is important to have some context for understanding how 
special education operates within California’s broader education 
system.  California has the largest population of any state in the 
country, and consequently also has the largest population of students 
of any state in the country, placing a greater strain on California’s 
education system in a number of ways.127  In the 2010–2011 school 
year, the student-to-teacher ratio in California was 24.1:1, compared 
to 16:1 nationally, ranking California forty-ninth out of fifty-one 
(fifty states and the District of Columbia) in student-to-teacher 
ratio.128  The student-to-administrator ratio in California was 333.7:1, 
compared to 215.5:1 nationally, ranking California forty-eighth in the 
country in student-to-administrator ratio.129  In 2013, California 
dropped to forty-ninth in per student spending in the nation, spending 
$8,482 per student, which is $3,342—or 28%—below the national 
average of $12,842 per student.130  Based on these numbers, it is 
clear that one of California’s biggest problems is the lack of 
professional adults—especially teachers—in the system to serve the 
sheer number of students in California.131   
                                                            
126 Id. 
127 PACE, Reforming Education in California 7 (2010), 
http://edpolicyinca.org/sites/default/files/2010_REFORMING_ED_IN_CA_WEB.
pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2014). 
128 Patrick Keaton, Public Elementary and Secondary School Student 
Enrollment and Staff Counts from the Common Core of Data: School Year 2010–
11, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS 14 (Apr. 2012), 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012327.pdf. 
129 Id. 
130 John Fensterwald, California Drops to 49th in School Spending in Annual 
Ed Week Report, ED SOURCE (Jan. 14, 2013), 
http://edsource.org/today/2013/california-drops-to-49th-in-school-spending-in-
annual-ed-week-report/25379#.UwlqmhbbdUT.  
131 Id.  California also has a unique student body: 
California educates approximately one-third of the nation’s 
English language learners, more than three-quarters of whom are 
Spanish-speaking.  More than [forty] percent of California’s 
public school children speak a first language other than English.  
English language learners face significant challenges beyond 
those faced by native English speakers.  The majority of these 
students are living in poverty with parents who have very little 
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The volume of students in the system places a huge strain on the 
resources available to the California education system,132 without yet 
taking into account the additional resources required to run special 
education programs in California or the special needs of students 
with disabilities.  The shortage of teachers and other professional 
personnel is particularly prevalent in high-need areas.133  High-need 
schools face the challenge of attracting and retaining high-quality, 
experienced teachers, which is problematic in that teacher turnover 
has a high impact on student achievement and success.134  
Additionally, areas with high turnover rates lose money in teacher 
professional development.135 
The independent, nonpartisan research center, Policy Analysis for 
California Education (PACE), determined that the education system 
in California is more dependent on state funding than almost every 
other state in the country,136 making education finance an issue 
                                                            
education.  They require teachers with special skills, as they 
need to learn both a new language and the academic 
curriculum. California faces a severe shortage of teachers with 
these skills. 
Id. at 3. 
132 Id. at 4. 
133 Id. at 3–4.  The term “high-need” refers to areas with high poverty rates and 
low Academic Performance Index (API) scores.  Id.  API measures the progress of 
the school itself, as opposed to the progress of the individual students.  Id. at 4–7. 
134 Id.  It is widely acknowledged that “[t]eachers are the single most important 
influence on the education of students.”  Id. at 6.  Additionally, “compensation . . . 
represents the largest share of the state’s education budget.”  Id.  Some argue that 
more effective use of the state’s education budget through “eliminating perverse 
incentives, increasing local flexibility and innovation, and encouraging 
experimentation with alternative approaches to recruitment, retention, and 
compensation would better equip California’s schools to find and retain teachers 
who can ensure success for all of their students, especially those facing the biggest 
challenges.”  Id. at 6. 
135 Id. at 3. 
136 Id. at 15.  California is more dependent on state funding than most other 
states, and the state’s finance system itself is very complicated:  
[T]he state’s system of finance is so complex that only a handful 
of experts understand how California’s schools are financed.  
This complexity imposes costs without providing benefits to the 
education system.  California would gain from policies that 
increase transparency and flexibility in funding.  Increased 
flexibility would enable districts and schools to direct funds to 
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primarily for state and local agencies.137  However, similar to most 
other states, California’s system of education is fraught with 
inequalities in the money and resources available to different schools 
and school districts across the state.138  It is clear that reforming and 
improving California’s education system in general will require a 
great deal more funding.139  California’s greatest concern is the lack 
of funds to provide both regular students and special education 
students with the tools and resources they need to be successful.  
General funding principles in California affect how California 
evaluates and regulates special education, and has a big impact on 
how courts will likely view the interrelationship between the ADA 
and the IDEA. 
 
B. Special Education in California 
 
Special education in California operates differently than general 
education in California, affecting how the courts must view the IDEA 
and the ADA.  In order to receive special education, the student must 
have a disability and the disability must interfere with his or her 
education.140  A student is not qualified to receive special services 
until the school has tried to meet the student’s needs within the 
parameters of the system as it exists for students without 
disabilities.141  After it is determined that the school cannot meet the 
student’s needs in the general education program, the student is 
referred for a professional evaluation of his or her disability to see if 
he or she is qualified for special education.142  At the beginning of 
2013, approximately 686,000 students with disabilities received 
special education services in the state of California,143 which is 
approximately 10% of the students in the public education system in 
                                                            
meet local needs, and to avoid the costs of compliance with 
today’s complex funding rules.   
Id. 
137 Id.   
138 Id. 
139 Id.  
140 Taylor, supra note 68, at 8. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 9. 
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the state.144  About 618,000 of these students are in grades 
kindergarten through twelfth grade.145  In California, 41% of students 
with disabilities have specific learning disabilities, “affecting one or 
more of the basic processes involved in understanding/using 
language or performing mathematical calculations.”146  Speech or 
language disabilities affect approximately 25% of students with 
disabilities in California, and autism affects approximately 10% of 
students with disabilities in California.147  Over the past few decades, 
the number of students identified with specific learning disabilities 
                                                            
144 Id.; see also Special Education CalEd Facts, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 
OF CALIFORNIA, available at http://www.cde.ca.gov/sp/se/sr/cefspeced.asp (last 
visited Dec. 30, 2014): 
 Intellectual disabilities: 43,303 
 Speech or language impairment: 164,600 
 Visual impairment: 4,327 
 Emotional disturbance: 25,984 
Orthopedic impairment: 14,261 
Other health impairment: 61,309 
Specific learning disability: 278,697 
Deafness: 3,946 
Hard of hearing: 9,991 
Deaf-blindness: 160 
Multiple disabilities: 5,643 
Autism: 71,825 
 Traumatic brain injury: 1,771 
Id. 
145 Taylor, supra note 68, at 9. 
146 Id. at 9; see also Department of Education, Specific Learning Disability, 
available at http://doe.sd.gov/oess/documents/sped_RtI_eligibility.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 30, 2014): 
Specific learning disability is a disorder in one or more of the 
basic psychological processes involved in understanding or in 
using spoken or written language that may manifest itself in the 
imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or do 
mathematical calculations.  The term includes such conditions as 
perceptual disabilities, brain injury, minimal brain dysfunction, 
dyslexia, and developmental aphasia.  The term does not apply to 
students who have learning problems that are primarily the result 
of visual, hearing, or motor disabilities; cognitive disability; 
emotional disturbance; or environmental, cultural, or economic 
disadvantage.   
Id. 
147 Taylor, supra note 68, at 9. 
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has dropped, while the overall number of students with disabilities 
has significantly increased.148  The report, Overview of Special 
Education in California, generated by the California Legislative 
Analyst’s Office, states that this is a general trend that is reflected 
across the nation, demonstrating the need for a unified theory 
regarding the relationship between the ADA and the IDEA 
nationwide.149   
The most common service provided for students with special 
education needs is specialized academic instruction.150  The next 
largest category of service provided is speech and language 
therapy—over 300,000 students receive this service.151  Other 
services include occupational therapy, counseling services, 
interpreting services, and physical therapy.152  Additionally, schools 
are required to develop specific services for students once they reach 
the age of sixteen in order to prepare them to transition into 
postsecondary activities.153  These services include, “vocational and 
career readiness activities, college counseling, and training in 
independent living skills.”154  In addition to procedural requirements, 
federal law provides parents with the right to challenge the specific 
                                                            
148 Id. at 10. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 11. 
151  Id.  “Speech-language pathology services” is defined as: 
I. Identification of children with speech or language 
impairments; 
II. Diagnosis and appraisal of specific speech or language 
impairments; 
III. Referral for medical or other professional attention necessary 
for the habilitation of speech or language impairments; 
IV. Provision of speech and language services for the 
habilitation or prevention of communicative impairments; 
and  
V. Counseling and guidance of parents, children, and teachers 
regarding speech andlanguage impairments.  
34 C.F.R. § 300.34 (c)(15) (2014). 
152 34 C.F.R. § 300.34 (c) (2014). 
153 Taylor, supra note 68, at 11. 
154 Id. 
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services that their children receive.155  
In California, special education funding is administered through 
127 Special Education Local Plan Areas (SELPAs) rather than 
through the districts in the state.156  SELPAs are composed of 
districts, county offices of education, and charter schools, which all 
have unique organizational and operating structures.157  In California, 
the average cost of providing for a student with disabilities as 
compared to a student without disabilities is more than double—
$22,300 compared to $9,600.158  The additional funds are supported 
by “an average of about $2,300 in federal funds, about $5,400 in state 
funds, and about $5,000 in local funds.”159  Excess costs to support 
special education in California have increased over the past several 
years, in part due to more students with severe disabilities.160 
Special education in California is funded using a census-funding 
model, which means that the amount of state aid is determined based 
primarily on the number of students enrolled in the district and the 
amount of aid is fixed per student:161   
 
Census funding differs from all other methods used by 
states for distributing special education funds because 
aid is largely independent of the characteristics of 
special education programs, such as the number of 
students served. . . . States adopting census funding 
limited their fiscal exposure to rising disability rates 
by ceasing to provide aid based on factors that 
districts arguably can influence (e.g., the number of 
students identified, the nature of their disabilities, how 
students are served across educational environments, 
or the resources committed to helping each student), 
                                                            
155 See, e.g., note 92 and accompanying text. 
156 Taylor, supra note 68, at 5. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 6. 
159 Id. at 14. 
160 Id. at 15–16. 
161 Elizabeth Dhuey, Funding Special Education by Total District Enrollment: 
Advantages, Disadvantages, and Policy Considerations 5, available at 
http://homes.chass.utoronto.ca/~edhuey/datastore/files/docs/EFP_policy_brief_Dhu
ey_Lipscomb_Jan_21_2013.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2014). 
    
Fall 2014 An IDEA for Special Education 433 
thus forcing school districts to assume more fiscal 
responsibility for additional special education 
services.162 
 
In applying this model, California assumes additional costs to meet 
special education needs, and funding for special education is 
distributed based on total enrollment instead of special education 
enrollment specifically.163  The census-funding model has its 
advantages and disadvantages.164  One advantage is that it is a 
transparent formula for calculating funding—it is purely based on 
enrollment.165  Because school districts know how their funding is 
being calculated, they are able to make plans to effectively use their 
funding.  The ability of school districts to know, more or less, how 
much money they will be receiving is a huge advantage given 
California’s already scarce resources for the large population of 
students district to district.166  Another major advantage is that census 
funding also lowers the incentive to over-identify disabilities in order 
to receive more funding because the amount of funding is based on 
enrollment of students as a whole, not only on the students with 
recognized disabilities.167  However, this model also has its 
disadvantages.  One disadvantage is that the census-funding model 
does not consider the actual number of students with disabilities per 
district and instead assumes uniformity of additional costs to meet the 
needs of special education students.168  Studies assessing the special 
education needs across a state have flatly rejected the idea of 
uniformity across a state.169   
Based on the numbers discussed above, it is clear that one of 
California’s greatest issues in education is the lack of funding and 
resources to provide for all of the students in the system.  The ADA 
and the IDEA impose standards on California schools, and 
                                                            
162 Id. at 5–6. 
163 Id. at 9–10. 
164 Id. at 9. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 9–10. 
167 Id. at 10. 
168 Id. at 13. 
169 Id. 
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compliance with these standards has a direct relationship to available 
funding and resources.  Furthermore, access to education provided by 
the IDEA requires schools to spend more money on students with 
disabilities than on the average student.170  The more obligations 
schools have to a student, the more funding schools need to fulfill 
their federal obligations to special education students.  California is 
likely expending resources just to account for the disparity in the 
relationship between these two acts.  In order to cope with an already 
overtaxed system, courts need to have one clear, cost-effective 
compliance standard for California districts and schools.  
 
V. THE IDEA SHOULD HAVE PRIMACY OVER THE ADA IN 
SPECIAL EDUCATION 
 
A. Comparing the Purposes of the ADA and the IDEA 
 
While the Ninth Circuit held that compliance with the IDEA does 
not automatically guarantee compliance with the ADA, it is 
important to assess how the ADA and the IDEA differ and what these 
differences mean for school districts.  The goals of the ADA and the 
IDEA are similar in that they both aim to protect the rights of 
individuals with disabilities; however, they have noticeable and 
measurable differences: “The ADA's goal of enabling people with 
disabilities to receive the same opportunities as people without 
disabilities is distinct from the IDEA's goal of enabling students with 
disabilities to receive the same educational opportunities as 
nondisabled students.”171  There are educational and noneducational 
distinctions between the ADA and the IDEA.  The difference in 
purpose between the ADA and the IDEA, at its most basic level, is 
that the former piece of legislation deals with providing people with 
disabilities the same opportunities, while the latter deals specifically 
with providing people with disabilities the same educational 
opportunities as those without disabilities.172  Due to this distinction, 
they have different definitions for what qualifies as a disability.  
                                                            
170 PACE, supra note 127, at 2.  In 2006–2007, spending on special education 
students in California was 140% higher than spending for regular education 
students.  Dhuey, supra note 161, at 3 n.4. 
171 Mac Lagan, supra note 43, at 743. 
172 Id. at 740. 
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As discussed below, the ADA definition continues to broaden 
with each reauthorization,173 whereas the IDEA definition continues 
to narrow.174  A broader ADA definition that defines disability as a 
physical or mental impairment limiting a major life activity 
incorporates more individuals with disabilities under the Act, but 
moves even further away from a focus on education.175  In contrast, a 
narrower IDEA definition focuses more purposefully on disabilities 
that affect education, such as hearing impairments, autism, and 
specific learning disabilities.176 
In addition, with a definition of disability that focuses more 
specifically on education, the IDEA has more extensive procedural 
requirements than the ADA.177  The IDEA sets a standard for access 
to education and requires school districts to ensure that students with 
disabilities meet that standard of access through individualized 
programs regardless of the cost or administrative burden it takes to 
make that happen.178  In contrast, the ADA requires school districts 
to make existing services equally accessible, but only so far as it does 
not unnecessarily burden or alter the existing programs.179  This 
distinction demonstrates that the goal of the IDEA is access to 
education, whereas the goal of the ADA is preventing general 
discrimination based on disability.  Due to their differing goals, the 
IDEA’s obligations to students are different than the ADA’s 
obligations to students.  For example, under Title II of the ADA, a 
public school must provide DHH students with communications that 
are as effective as the communications that are provided for 
individuals without a disability.180  Under the IDEA, a school must 
provide each individual DHH student with a specific education 
                                                            
173 See infra Part V.B. 
174 See infra Part V.B. 
175 See supra Part II.C. 
176 See supra Part II.B. 
177 K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th 
Cir. 2013), cert. denied 134 S.Ct. 1493 (2014), cert. denied 134 S.Ct. 1494 (2014). 
178 Id. at 1097. 
179 Id. 
180 Brief for the Appellant as Amicus Curiae, Department of Justice at 10, 
K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2013), 
cert. denied 134 S.Ct. 1493 (2014), cert. denied 134 S.Ct. 1494 (2014) (Nos. 11-
56259, 12-56224). 
    
436 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 34-2 
program designed to meet that student’s individual educational 
needs.  
 When comparing the IDEA and the ADA, it is clear that the 
IDEA puts more pressure on school districts to help and support 
individuals with disabilities through their education—this is the Act’s 
specific purpose.  In ruling that a student can bring claims under both 
the IDEA and the ADA for the same situation, the Ninth Circuit did 
not honor the purpose of the IDEA. 
 
B. Congress Intended the IDEA to Govern Issues of Education 
 
The existence of the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement conveys to 
courts that Congress intended for the IDEA to take primacy over the 
ADA in issues related to students and special education.181  The 
IDEA’s exhaustion requirement182 requires that parents and students 
exhaust remedies available to them under the IDEA before they seek 
the same relief under other federal laws that protect individuals with 
disabilities—the language of the exhaustion requirement specifically 
includes the ADA.183  As it is explained by the California School 
Boards Association: “[A]s long as an ADA claim seeks relief that is 
also available under, or is the functional equivalent of relief under the 
IDEA, plaintiffs must exhaust IDEA remedies . . . .”184  The IDEA’s 
                                                            
181 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.  “For example, the IDEA's 
administrative exhaustion requirement has resulted in courts consistently holding 
that, inter alia, while section 504 can be used to enforce educational rights, the 
administrative procedures required by the IDEA must be exhausted before relief 
can be granted.”  Mac Lagan, supra note 43, at 744. 
182 The language of the “Exhaustion requirement” in the IDEA reads: 
Nothing in this title shall be construed to restrict or limit the 
rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, 
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, title V of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or other Federal laws protecting the 
rights of children with disabilities, except that before the filing of 
a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available 
under this part, the procedures under subsections (f) and (g) shall 
be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the 
action been brought under this part. 
See supra note 100 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2012)). 
183 See supra Part II.B–C. 
184 Amicus Curiae Brief of California School Boards Association and the 
National School Boards Association In Support of Petitioners at 14, K.M. ex rel. 
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language is more detailed than that of the ADA, and the process for 
making a claim is more extensive under the IDEA than under the 
ADA; this detail points in favor of the IDEA’s primacy.  
In addition to the inclusion of the exhaustion requirement in the 
IDEA, Congress’s intent is demonstrated by comparing the most 
recent amendments to the ADA and the IDEA, respectively.  The last 
major changes to the IDEA were the 2004 Amendments—also 
known as the IDEIA.185  Following the IDEIA, the Department of 
Education Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services 
released the rules and regulations governing the new changes to the 
IDEIA to explain the new changes to the states, as well as how to 
implement them.186  The changes to the IDEA, as a whole, through 
these amendments, were extensive and were made to broaden the 
scope of their application to more students.  Their purpose was also 
to further guarantee that students with disabilities have access to 
disability services. 187   
 As this comment has focused on a case that discussed two DHH 
students,188 it is worth noting that the IDEIA included several 
provisions specifically to aid DHH students.189  As the California 
School Boards Association notes, Congress has taken action to 
specifically address the needs of DHH students in amendments to the 
IDEA rather than through amendments to the ADA.190  This reveals 
Congress’s intent for the IDEA to govern these issues rather than the 
ADA.191  The language and communication needs of DHH students 
are not even considered in the ADA.192  For example, the definition 
                                                            
Bright, 725 F.3d 1088 (Nos. 13-770, 13-777) [hereinafter Brief of California 
School Boards]. 
185 Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, 20 
U.S.C. §§ 1400–1475 (2012). 
186 Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant and 
Urging Remand at 10, K.M. ex rel. Bright, 725 F.3d 1088 (No. 11-56259), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/app/briefs/kmtustinbr.pdf. 
187 Brief of California School Boards, supra note 184, at 7. 
188 See supra Part III. 
189 Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, §§ 
1400–1475. 
190 Brief of California School Boards, supra note 184, at 7. 
191 Id.  
192 Id. 
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of “interpreting services” in the IDEA was changed to include 
transcription services such as CART and Typewell for children who 
are deaf or hard-of-hearing.193  This service was not an option prior 
to the 2004 Amendments, so the addition of this service in 
particular—the service at issue in K.M. ex rel. Bright—provides 
support for the notion that the IDEA should be controlling over the 
ADA.  Furthermore, Congress also took care to ensure that the 
definition of supplementary aids and services included services that 
enable a child to participate in extracurricular and nonacademic 
settings in school.194 
Additionally, sections in the IDEA regarding IEPs were amended 
in order to make the process more inclusive of parents of children 
with disabilities.195  The Department of Education clarified that:  
 
[A] child does not have to fail or be retained in a 
course or grade in order to be considered for special 
education and related services.  However, in order to 
be a child with a disability under the Act, a child must 
have one or more of the impairments identified in 
section 602(3) of the Act and need special education 
and related services because of that impairment.196 
 
This is an important addition to the IDEA because it makes it 
clear that the intended purpose of the IDEA is to be inclusive rather 
than exclusive of students with disabilities.  The amendments to the 
IDEA over time have taken care to include the far more specific 
needs of DHH students within the education system, showing that the 
IDEA should have primacy over the ADA when deciding matters 
concerning education of students with disabilities. 
                                                            
193 See supra Part II.C. 
194 See supra Part II.C. 
195 See supra Part II.C.  But see Demetra Edwards, New Amendments to 
Resolving Special Education Disputes: Any Good IDEAs?, 5 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. 
L.J. 137, 159 (2005) (arguing that the IDEA amendments make the dispute 
resolution process less inclusive of parents of children with disabilities). 
196 Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities and 
Preschool Grants for Children with Disabilities; Final Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 156, 
DEP’T OF EDUC. (Aug. 16, 2006), available at 
http://idea.ed.gov/download/finalregulations.pdf. 
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 While the IDEA amendments addressed more specific needs of 
students, the most recent set of major amendments to the ADA, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 
(ADAAA) broadened the definition of “disability.”197 The language 
of the Act specifically references Congress’s intent: “[T]he intent of 
Congress [is] that the primary object of attention in cases brought 
under the ADA should be whether entities covered under the ADA 
have complied with their obligations[.] . . . [T]he question of whether 
an individual’s impairment is a disability under the ADA should not 
demand extensive analysis.”198  Congress explained that the purpose 
of the ADA Amendments is to shift the focus away from defining a 
disability and to move toward assessing whether discrimination is 
taking place because of an individual’s disability.199  The purpose of 
the ADAAA had very little do with the education of individuals with 
disabilities.  In fact, the word “education” is mentioned only once in 
the entire text of the Act.200  The part of the Act that specifically 
                                                            
197 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012).  One of the findings and purposes of the 
ADAAA was: 
[T]o convey congressional intent that the standard created by the 
Supreme Court in the case of Toyota Motor Manufacturing, 
Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) for 
‘‘substantially limits’’, and applied by lower courts in numerous 
decisions, has created an inappropriately high level of limitation 
necessary to obtain coverage under the ADA, to convey that it is 
the intent of Congress that the primary object of attention in 
cases brought under the ADA should be whether entities covered 
under the ADA have complied with their obligations, and to 
convey that the question of whether an individual’s impairment is 
a disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis 
. . . . 
ADA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
110s3406enr/pdf/BILLS-110s3406enr.pdf (last visited Dec. 31, 2014). 
198 ADA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008, supra note 197. 
199 Id. 
200 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012).  “Education” is 
mentioned in the section pertaining to Rules of Construction:  
Nothing in this Act alters the provision of section 
302(b)(2)(A)(ii), specifying that reasonable modifications in 
policies, practices, or procedures shall be required, unless an 
entity can demonstrate that making such modifications in 
policies, practices, or procedures, including academic 
requirements in postsecondary education, would fundamentally 
    
440 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 34-2 
mentions education does so only to explain that nothing in these 
amendments is to alter an institution’s requirement to make 
reasonable modifications unless doing so fundamentally alters “the 
nature of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
accommodations involved.”201  Broadening the definition of 
“disability” only causes confusion and liability for schools and 
districts trying to accommodate students with disabilities.202  The 
ADAAA complicates education of individuals with disabilities rather 
than improves it,203 and further demonstrates that Congress intended 
the IDEA, not the ADA, to govern issues of special education.   
 
C. The Exhaustion Requirement and the IDEA in Other Federal 
Circuits 
 
 In Pace v. Bogalusa City School Board,204 the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals addressed this issue.  The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the 
Ninth Circuit and concluded that the failure of an IDEA claim 
precludes an ADA claim when the claims under these acts are 
factually and legally indistinct.205  In Pace, Travis Pace, a high 
school student with physical and developmental disabilities, brought 
claims against the school board and the State of Louisiana under the 
ADA and the IDEA.206  Suffering from cerebral palsy, Travis was 
confined to a wheelchair and challenged the lack of handicap 
accessible facilities at Bogalusa High School, as well as deficiencies 
in Travis’s IEP.207  The court of appeals adopted the district court’s 
ruling that the school had satisfied its obligations to Travis under the 
IDEA.208   
The court next addressed the ADA claim, first comparing the 
                                                            
alter the nature of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages, or accommodations involved. 
ADA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008, supra note 197. 
201 ADA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008, supra note 197; see also supra note 30. 
202 Smith & Bales, supra note 52, at 397. 
203 Id. at 413. 
204 403 F.3d 272, 274–75 (5th Cir. 2005). 
205 Smith & Bales, supra note 52, at 396–97. 
206 Pace, 403 F.3d at 275.  
207 Id. 
208 Id. at 290. 
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accessibility standards under the IDEA and the accessibility 
standards under the ADA.209  The court reasoned that if the 
accessibility standards are the same, then Travis’s claim under the 
ADA is precluded by the court’s rejection of Travis’s claim under the 
IDEA.210  The court of appeals agreed with the hearing officer that 
FAPE had been provided under the IDEA and dismissed the other 
claims on the grounds that they were legally “indistinct” from the 
IDEA issue that had already been resolved.211  Therefore, the court 
concluded that because the evidence supported that the school had 
fulfilled its obligations under the IDEA, Travis was collaterally 
estopped from asserting an ADA claim.212   
This court based its decision on the legal similarity between the 
ADA’s and the IDEA’s accessibility standards and remedies.  This is 
synonymous with establishing that the IDEA has primacy over the 
ADA in issues of special education, but it is persuasive authority.  
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that if the remedies are similar or the 
same, then a plaintiff is precluded from bringing the same issue under 
both acts.  Doing so addresses the inefficiency of adjudicating claims 
in special education, and as discussed above, Congress intended for 
the IDEA to govern issues of education.  Travis had been provided 
FAPE under the IDEA, so he was precluded from bringing the same 
claim under the ADA. 
 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held a similar position as the 
Fifth Circuit on the relationship between the ADA and the IDEA.  In 
Independent School District No. 283 v. S.D.,213 the court of appeals 
affirmed the district court’s ruling that the school district satisfied the 
IDEA’s FAPE requirements.214  The court then explained that the 
resolution of this issue resolved the other non-IDEA claims.215  
While the ADA is not specifically mentioned in this court’s opinion, 
the holding is consistent with the IDEA’s primacy over other federal 
laws in issues of education, including the ADA, because the Fifth 
                                                            
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 292. 
211 Id. at 297. 
212 Id. at 296–97. 
213 88 F.3d 556, 559 (8th Cir. 1996). 
214 Id. at 561–62. 
215 Id. at 562. 
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Circuit explained that the non-IDEA claims were necessarily satisfied 
through the IDEA ruling.  The court specifically addressed the IDEA 
claims first, pursuant to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement.216  As 
discussed above, the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement places heavy 
weight on the IDEA’s primacy over the ADA in matters of special 
education, which is seen in this case—the Fifth Circuit prevented the 
plaintiff from bringing an ADA claim under another law when there 
was an IDEA remedy.   
 In placing emphasis on the IDEA, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits 
were correct to decide that one act precludes the other in cases in 
which the remedies and legal standards for the claim are the same.  
As has been discussed, it is true that schools as public entities must 
comply with the ADA and schools as institutions of education must 
comply with the IDEA, but this causes inefficiency and 
inconsistency.  Courts, especially in California, should take this one 
step further and accept the IDEA as having primacy over the ADA 
with all issues that pertain to special education.   
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The ADA and the IDEA are two federal laws that focus 
specifically on individuals with disabilities.  Historically, both have 
been used to address the same situations that arise with the education 
of individuals with disabilities, but this has caused inefficiency and 
confusion.  While it is not possible, as the education system exists 
today, to give individuals with disabilities everything that they need, 
it is possible to make the first step towards helping students with 
disabilities by giving courts direction as to how they should treat the 
interrelationship of federal laws that protect and support these 
particular students. 
Through the IDEA Exhaustion requirement, the 2004 IDEA 
Amendments, and the 2008 ADA Amendments, Congress made its 
intent clear—the IDEA should have primacy over the ADA in 
matters concerning the education of individuals with disabilities.  By 
this reasoning, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was wrong to 
conclude that K.M.’s and D.H.’s claims should be litigated under 
both the ADA and the IDEA.  At first glance, the fairest option 
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would appear to be to give plaintiffs the opportunity to bring their 
education claims under every statute protecting individuals with 
disabilities, but to do so breeds inconsistent holdings by the judiciary 
and weakens the focus on education. 
The IDEA, with all of its complications, does the most to address 
the specific learning needs of each student.  In California in 
particular, a state that is supporting a large student body on limited 
resources, allowing courts to evaluate issues under the IDEA at the 
exclusion of the ADA will help the special education system develop 
in a way that is efficient, and in a way that is the most beneficial for 
students with disabilities.  
 
 
